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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:
AN EMERGING PRIVILEGE
MARTIN J. ROONEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
* . ."I In recent United States Supreme Court cases con-
cerning the first amendment, a privilege appears to be
emerging that provides the press with rights distinguishable
from the freedom of speech rights that citizens, the nonpress,
possess. Although this "new" privilege has not yet been
fully explored by the Court, a review of current legal litera-
ture reveals considerable debate concerning not only the
existence of the privilege, but also its scope and meaning.
After briefly reviewing the history of the speech and press
clauses, this author will examine afresh the evidence for and
against the existence of this "new" first amendment
privilege.
Historically, under the first amendment neutrality doc-
trine, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the press to
almost complete automony from governmental restriction.2
The absence of special press rights vis-a-vis the government
is a corollary to government neutrality. However, the neu-
trality doctrine has been, and arguably should be, relaxed in
some cases to accommodate the special roles that the govern-
ment and the press play in our society. Strict application of
the neutrality doctrine has been waived, for example, in the
area of prior restraints, where it is widely acknowledged that
the government can restrain the media from publishing even
truthful information to insure the proper functioning of an
* B.A., University of New Hampshire, 1979; J.D., Boston College Law School,
1982; associate, Curley & Curley, Boston, Massachusetts.
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731, 751 (1977).
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essential governmental role, such as national defense.3 Con-
versely, the press should be allowed, in some limited circum-
stances, to go beyond the constraints imposed by the
neutrality doctrine in order to protect its special role in
society.
II. HISTORY
One certainty emerges from a review of the history of
both the speech and press clauses: the true intent of the first
amendment's authors is essentially unknown.4  "The precise
motives of those who drafted the speech and press clauses of
the first amendment are unlikely to be discovered now, if
3. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (protection from previ-
ous restraint is not absolutely unlimited); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) ("[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent"); United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (preliminary injunction is-
sued restraining publisher from printing allegedly restrictive data concerning the H-
Bomb because publication would violate the Atomic Energy Act and endanger na-
tional security), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. While different historians and commentators have reached various conclusions
about the meaning of the first amendment, there is broad agreement that the history
of the amendment reveals little of the framers' intent. Dean Levy, in his extensive
review of freedom of speech and press in early American history, demonstrates this
fact at several points in his book entitled Legacy of Suppression. He notes:
[I]t is astonishing to discover that the debate on the bill of rights, during the
ratification controversy, was conducted at a level of abstraction so vague as to
convey the impression that Americans of 1787-1788 had only the most nebu-
lous conception of the meaning of the particular rights they sought to insure;
indeed many of the principal advocates of a bill of rights had only a nebulous
idea of what it ought to contain. Freedom of the press was everywhere a grand
topic for declamation, but the insistent demand for its protection on parchment
was not accompanied by a reasoned analysis of what it meant, how far it ex-
tended, and under what circumstances it might be limited .....
L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 214-15 (1960).
Professor Emerson, another leading constitutional scholar, has observed that it is
"by no means clear exactly what the colonists had in mind, or just what they expected
from the guarantee of freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition." Emerson,
Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
737, 737 (1977). See also Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-35
(1941); E. HUDSON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA (1963); Abrams,
The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7
HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 574 (1979); Lange, The Speech and Press Clause, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 77, 88, 91 n.75; Lewis, A Preferred Positionfor Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 595, 599; Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privi-
legefor the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 629, 635-36 (1979). See generally
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indeed they were ever ascertainable.' '5 Indeed, "[t]he truth
is, I think, that the framers had no very clear idea as to what
they meant *"6 In his ground breaking address to the
Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation,7 Justice
Potter Stewart proposed the theory that both the history of
the Revolution and our relations with Britain revealed
clearly the unique role of the institutional press in the nas-
cent American colonies, and the need to protect it. "This
formidable check on official power was what the British
Crown had feared-and what the American Founders de-
cided to risk." 8 Justice Stewart found additional support for
his view in the wording of the first amendment itself-
This basic undertstanding is essential, I think, to avoid
an elementary error of constitutional law. It is tempting to
suggest that freedom of the press means only that newspa-
per publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They
are guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all
because of the Free Speech Clause. If the Free Press guar-
antee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would
be a constitutional redundancy. Between 1776 and the
drafting of our Constitution, many of the state constitu-
tions contained clauses protecting freedom of the press
while at the same time recognizing no general freedom of
speech. By including both guarantees in the First Amend-
ment, the Founders quite clearly recognized the distinction
between the two.9
H. DRINKER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 2-6 (1957).
Most recently, the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion that Dean Levy
and other commentators have reached. Writing for the majority in Minneapolis Star
& Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983), Justice
O'Connor stated:
In general, though, we only have limited evidence of exactly how the Framers
intended the First Amendment to apply. There are no recorded debates in the
Senate or in the States, and the discussion in the House of Representatives was
couched in general terms, perhaps in response to Madison's suggestion that the
representatives not stray from simple acknowledged principles.
Id. at 1371 n.6.
5. Lewis, supra note 4, at 599.
6. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949).
7. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (address reprinted ex-
cept for opening courtesies).
8. Id. at 634.
9. Id. at 633-34 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the wording of the original
first amendment, as drafted by Madison, also contained a clear distinction between
1983]
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Although this analysis has support in case law, many
commentators and historians read the history of the speech
and press clauses differently.' 0 According to Professor Levy,
a leading first amendment scholar, a correct reading of the
amendment would reveal that freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press were originally thought of as interchange-
able." Several other commentators concur with his view
that the framers intended to create one unified freedom, the
freedom of expression, encompassing both freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.12 Chief Justice Burger, a
proponent of this view, believes that the press freedom
"merit[s] special mention simply because it [has] been more
often the object of official restraints."' 3 However, as another
constitutional scholar points out, "the original understand-
ing of the Founders is not necessarily controlling. It is what
they said, and not necessarily what they meant, that in the
last analysis may be determinative. This is particularly true
when constitutional language is subjected to tensions not an-
ticipated when the text was written."'14
III. THE EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the
question of whether a separate, distinguishable right of free-
dom of the press exists apart from freedom of speech. The
the rights of the institutional press and the private citizen. That proposal stated in
part: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write,
or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bul-
warks of liberty shall be inviolate." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 454 (Gales & Seaton
eds. 1789). See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). As Justice Stewart correctly noted, at the time the Constitution was
drafted, ten states provided for protection of the freedom of the press while only two
protected freedom of speech. See L. LEVY, supra note 4, at 183-85.
10. There is a strong presumption that all language used in a legal document has
meaning or it would not have been used. See, e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676
(1972); United States v. Howell, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 432, 435 (1871).
11. L. LEVY, supra note 4, at 174.
12. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 4, at 88-95; Lewis, supra note 4, at 599; Nimmer,
Introduction - Is Freedom of the Press A Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom
of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1975).
13. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
14. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 641. The Supreme Court recently reiterated this
point in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct.
1365, 1371 n.6 (1983). See also H. DRINKER, supra note 4, at 2.
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Court however, has explored the rights of the press in sev-
eral other contexts and has implicitly, though vaguely, out-
lined the parameters of the press privilege.15 This author
will analyze these developments in six areas: (a) libel, (b)
access by the press, (c) access to the press, (d) protection of
confidential sources, (e) prior restraint of the news media
and (f) taxation of the press.
A. Libel
Prior to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,16 the Supreme Court
utilized an unwieldy and impractical test to determine
whether certain speech constituted libel. The pre-Gertz stan-
dard, advanced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 7 held
that defamatory statements concerning public officials were
privileged unless such statements were made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge of their falsity or with reck-
less disregard for their truth. 8 The application of this stan-
dard was expanded in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.' 9 to
allow first amendment immunity not only for statements
about public officials, but also for statements concerning
matters of "public or general concern." 20 In Gertz the Court
retreated from the far reaching implications of the Rosen-
15. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (magazine article
which allegedly described an attorney as a "Leninist," a "Communist-fronter," and
implied that the attorney had a criminal record and was an "architect" of a "frame-
up" of a police officer); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(newspaper refused to print political candidate's replies to articles critical of him;
"right to reply" statute held to be violative of the first amendment guarantee of a free
press); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison inmates and professional jour-
nalists challenged a regulation of the California Department of Corrections which
provided that "media interviews with specific individual inmates were not permitted";
held, not violative of right of free speech); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(newspaper reporter not accorded a constitutional testimonial privilege for an agree-
ment he makes to conceal facts relevant to investigation of a grand jury or to conceal
the criminal conduct of his source); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 704 (1931)
(newspaper printed articles which allegedly violated Minnesota statute; "the articles
charged in substance that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging
and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officials and agencies were
not energetically performing their duties.").
16. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Id. at 279-80.
19. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
20. Id. at 43-44.
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bloom decision 2' and attempted to reconcile the common-
law tort of defamation with first amendment principles.22
The issue in Gertz was the extent of press liability for defam-
atory statements about private individuals.2 3 The Court de-
cided that "[a]lowing the media to avoid liability only by
proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord
adequate protection to First Amendment liberties. 24 The
Court also asserted that as long as they "do not impose lia-
bility without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private indi-
vidual."25 This holding, according to Justice Powell's
opinion, "shields thepress and broadcast media from the rig-
ors of strict liability for defamation. 26
Gertz is characteristic of the Court's increasing willing-
ness to depart from a unitary free speech and press right.27
In its decision, the Court abandoned its traditional free
speech analysis, which had focused on "the content of any
given expression in light of [protection of the free exchange
of ideas], on the nexus between the subject matter expressed
and the function of the speech guarantee in our scheme of
self-government, and on the character of the purported evil
presented." 28 In place of the traditional analysis, the Court
emphasized "institutional considerations unrelated to partic-
ularized content."29
Free press, not free speech, was the focus of the Gertz
opinion. "The basic principles of independence of the press
from government and separateness of the press clause from
the speech clause are implicit in the Court's decision
... "30 The Court considered the facts surrounding publi-
21. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-48.
22. See id. at 349.
23. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 648.
24. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
27. Bezanson, .rupra note 2, at 748.
28. Id. at 748-49 (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 749.
30. Id.
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cation, that is, the institutional processes, not the content,
when it protected press rights.3'
B. Access by the Press
Although the Supreme Court has generally held that the
press has no basic right to gather the news,32 the Court has
stated that "news gathering is not without its First Amend-
ment protections." 33  This section will examine two areas
which highlight these conflicting tensions: (1) access to pris-
ons to gather news, and, more briefly, (2) access to the courts
to report various proceedings.
The neutrality doctrine, that is, the automony of the
press from government restriction or privilege, was initially
established in prison visitation cases. In Pell v. Procunier,34
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.3 and Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.,36 the Court denied the press expanded access to prison
facilities for radio and television interviews. In Pell and
Saxbe the Court held that the state's compelling interest in
the internal security of prisons outweighed the speech rights
of the inmates. 37 Noting that other methods of communica-
tion in addition to radio and television interviews were open
to the inmates, the Pell Court concluded that the balance
31. However, one commentator did not feel that the Court's concentration on the
processes of the press was significant:
[O]ne is left with the uneasy feeling that the Court's application of the new
doctrine to what may be regarded as the freedom of the press arena, and its
unarticulated exclusion of other "speech," may be have been inadvertent, and
that, further, the inadvertence was due precisely to the failure of the Court to
recognize that the freedoms of speech and press are not necessarily
coextensive.
Nimmer, supra note 12, at 649.
32. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (first amendment does
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally, for example, grand jury proceedings, Supreme
Court conferences, the scenes of crime or disaster or trials); New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the successful
conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national de-
fense require both confidentiality and secrecy"); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1965) (travel ban on reporter's trip to Cuba is an inhibition of action, not an inhibi-
tion on first amendment rights).
33. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
34. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
35. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
36. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
37. Pell, 417 U.S. at 823; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 848.
1983]
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struck did not infringe on the inmate's free speech right.38
Regarding the press, the Court found that no special right of
access exists under the free press clause. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, stated:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government
from interfering in any way with a free press. The Consti-
tution does not, however, require government to accord the
press special access to information not shared by members
of the public generally. It is one thing to say that a journal-
ist is free to seek out sources of information not available
to members of the general public, that he is entitled to
some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of
such sources,. . . and that government cannot restrain the
publication of news emanating from such sources. . . . It
is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution im-
poses upon government the affirmative duty to make avail-
able to journalists sources of information not available to
members of the public generally.3 9
Furthermore, in his majority opinion in Houchins. Chief
Justice Burger reasoned: "Neither the First Amendment nor
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information or sources of information within
the government's control." 4
These cases were among the first 41 to advance the doc-
trine of government neutrality towards the press. The doc-
trine, as applied in the prison visitation cases, postulates
that:
By giving special visitation rights to the press that are not
equally available to the general public, the government
would be promoting dependence of the press on the gov-
ernment, which would be destructive of the very purpose of
the press clause. The press is better off in the long run left
to its own devices, without substantial restraint on its in-
dependent investigative or reporting activities.42
38. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830-31; see also Nimmer, supra note 12, at 642.
39. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 (footnote and citation omitted).
40. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15.
41. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
42. Bezanson, supra note 2, at 755; see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Min-
nesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (1983). For further discussion of
Minneapolis Star, see infra text accompanying notes 103-19.
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Although the press possesses a somewhat greater right of ac-
cess to the prisoners than the public under Pell and Saxbe,
the right of access was not as broad as had been sought. The
press had asserted the right to interview preselected prison-
ers, but the Pell Court found that it only had the right to
interview inmates selected at random from the prison popu-
lation.43 One author has speculated that when both the press
and the public have no access or severely limited access, that
is, the rights of the public and the press are essentially
equal, a departure from the neutrality doctrine is necessary
to provide some form of effective access.44
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed this
reasoning in Houchins, a decision which sought to accom-
modate the press' special needs.4 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's reasoning,
preferring instead to strictly apply the neutrality doctrine. 6
Despite the Supreme Court's refusal to depart from the neu-
trality doctrine in these prison visitation cases, the issue of
accommodation of the press' special needs remains un-
resolved. Only seven justices participated in the Houchins
decision, with Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun excus-
ing themselves. However, both Justices Marshall and Black-
mun have recognized press rights in other contexts.47
Therefore, the issue of press accommodation has not been
foreclosed.48
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of ac-
cess to courtroom news, including trials and hearings. In
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,49 Warner attempted
to gain access to President Nixon's unreleased Watergate
43. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819-21.
44. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 644.
45. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1
(1978).
46. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
47. Specifically, Justice Marshall has recognized a broad right to gather informa-
tion. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586-97 (1980) (joining
Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun recognizes a right of access
to trials. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48. Indeed, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983), the Court seems to have adopted the theory sub silencio. See
infra text accompanying notes 173-78.
49. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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tapes. The Court applied the neutrality doctrine, holding
that: "The First Amendment generally grants the press no
right to information about a trial superior to that of the gen-
eral public." 50
More recently, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,5 1 the Court continued to adhere to the neutrality doc-
trine holding that the press' right of access to a criminal trial
is guaranteed by the first amendment. Although the case
was decided on the basis of the public's right of access, it was
both initiated by and beneficial to the press. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his concurring opinion, "the institu-
tional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary of a
right of access because it serves as the 'agent' of interested
citizens . - In the same vein, Justice Stevens described
this case as a "watershed case" because:
Twice before [in Saxbe and Houchins], the Court has im-
plied that any governmental restriction on access to infor-
mation, no matter how severe and no matter how
unjustified, would be constitutionally acceptable so long as
it did not single out the press for special disabilities not
applicable to the public at large . . . . Today, however,
for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an
arbitrary interference with access to important information
is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and ofthepress
protected by the First Amendment.53
In the Supreme Court's most recent decision in this area,
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,54 the Court upheld
the Richmond Newspapers decision and reaffirmed that the
right of access to criminal trials is guaranteed under the first
amendment." The Court did not specify whether this deci-
sion was based on speech or press clause, or both. It did,
however, distinguish the press from the general public. 6
50. Id. at 609.
51. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
52. Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
54. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
55. Id. at 2618-19.
56. Justice Brennan's majority opinion refers several times to the right of access
being vested in "the press and general public." Id. See also id. at 2623 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("the First Amendment protects the right of press and public to attend
criminal trials.").
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Given the Court's growing willingness to allow access to at
least some newsworthy information, 57 coupled with an
emerging distinction between the freedom of speech and
freedom of the press analyses, 58 the press may be gaining a
constitutionally protected right to gather the news as part of
the freedom of the press.
C Access to the Press
While the neutrality doctrine has prevented the press
from gaining any special access to information beyond that
granted to the general public, the doctrine has also protected
the press' right to publish what it wishes. The content of
what is published, with few exceptions, remains beyond gov-
ernment control.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,59 the Court
struck down a Florida "right to reply" statute, which re-
quired a newspaper publisher to print the replies of candi-
dates for public office who had been assailed in the press.60
The Court, in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice
Burger, upheld the press rights involved. The Court viewed
the press as a protected institution and rejected governmen-
tal interference in the editorial function.61 The Court
concluded:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit
for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of mate-
rial to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treat-
57. But see id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens read all these cases as creating a
right of access to all newsworthy matter, not solely to criminal trials as Justice
O'Connor read the cases. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2623.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 16-31.
59. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
60. Ia. at 258.
61. Id. at 256. In addition, the Court stated:
[We have] expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or requirement con-
stituted the compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that
which it would not otherwise print. The clear implication has been that any
such compulsion to publish that which "'reason' tells them should not be pub-
lished" is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable
goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like
many other virtues it cannot be legislated.
1983]
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ment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmen-
tal regulation of this crucial process can be exercised con-
sistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as
they have evolved to this time.62
Government control of the editorial process, therefore, was
not approved by the Court as a way to promote the press as
a "marketplace of ideas," in which all viewpoints are
brought forward.63 The Court distinguished between the
press rights and the speech rights of candidates to have their
positions printed, and acted to uphold the independence and
automony of the press to publish only what they chose to
print.64
The Court had previously supported the freedom of edi-
torial discretion in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee.65 In a complex holding,
the Court found that CBS's denial of television time to the
Democratic National Committee for political advertising
constituted state action; however, such action was not viola-
tive of the first amendment.66 The Court acknowledged that
it was "[b]alancing the various First Amendment interests
involved in the broadcast media and determining what best
serves the public's right to be informed . *."..- It con-
cluded that the fight of the press to refuse editorial advertis-
ing outweighed the speech interests of the advertisers. 68 As
Chief Justice Burger said, "[flor better or worse, editing is
62. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).
63. The Tornillo Court elaborated on the "marketplace of ideas" concept:
However much validity may be found in these arguments [for access to allow
all points of view on a subject to be brought forward], at each point the imple-
mentation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls
for some mechanism, either governmental or consensual. If it is governmental
coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions
of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed
over the years.
Id. at 254 (footnotes omitted). See also Bezanson, supra note 2, at 758.
64. Bezanson, supra note 2, at 757-58. See also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-55.
65. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
66. Chief Justice Burger, who was joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in
this part of his opinion, found that there was no state action. Id. at 119-21.
67. Id at 102.
68. Id. at 121-25.
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what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of
material. ' 69 Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, stated that
"if those [first amendment] 'values' mean anything, they
should mean at least this: If we must choose whether edito-
rial decisions are to be made in the free judgment of individ-
ual broadcasters, or imposed by bureaucratic fiat, the choice
must be for freedom. 7 °
Together the Tornillo and Democratic National Commit-
tee decisions reveal clearly the Court's strong belief in the
automony of the press in its editorial capacity. Moreover,
the two cases show the Court's even-handed application of
the neutrality doctrine because the Court refused to impose
governmental constraints on the editorial process, even
though the constraints were sought for the purpose of pro-
moting the speech rights of other citizens.
D. Protection of Confidential Sources
The Court addressed the question of a reporter's right to
protect a confidential source in Branzburg v. Hayes.7' In a
confusing five to four decision,72 which sets forth no clear
test for lower courts to follow, 7 3 the Court rejected the re-
porter's argument that he possessed a special first amend-
ment privilege not to reveal confidential sources to a grand
jury.74 Lacking further guidance from the Supreme Court,
lower courts have construed Branzburg in various ways.
Some courts have not recognized any privilege.75 Others
have acknowledged a limited privilege.76  One court re-
69. Id. at 124.
70. Id. at 126 (Stewart, J., concurring).
71. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
72. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). Some commentators say the vote was
actually 4-1/2 to 4-1/2, with Justice Powell's concurrence being the split vote due to
his suggestion that in some circumstances there may indeed be some special press
protection. See Bezanson, supra note 2, at 760; Stewart, supra note 7, at 635.
73. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 2, at 760 nn.135-136.
74. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 698.
75. See, e.g., In re Tierney, 328 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976) (first amendment
did not relieve newpaper reporter of obligation to respond to grand jury subpoena
and answer questions related directly to sanctity and integrity of grand jury function;
thus, reporter held to have no first amendment privilege to refuse to answer grand
jury's questions).
76. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognition of limited
privilege if the grand jury investigation was instituted or conducted in other than
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quired strict scrutiny of grand jury requests that a reporter
testify.77
Justice White, writing for the majority in Branzburg,
found that "news gathering is not without its First Amend-
ment protections, 78 for "without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." 79 However, the Court also found that the neu-
trality doctrine applied to this assertion of a special privi-
legeA0 Although the press clause protects the press from
governmental restraints and regulations, it also prevents the
government from granting special privileges to the press
which assist its efforts to gather the news. Therefore, the
Court concluded that the reporter could not successfully as-
sert a first amendment privilege not to reveal his confidential
news source since a private individual could not do so.81 To
allow a reporter to protect his source by quashing a sub-
poena, as requested in Branzburg, would have been nonneu-
tral governmental action. Such action would be tantamount
to special treatment of the press.8 2
Justice Powell concurred with Justice White, but stated
that where the news reporter is being harassed, or the infor-
mation being sought is at best tenuously related to the grand
jury's investigation, a motion to quash should be upheld.83
The dissenters, Justices Stewart, Brennan and Marshall, pro-
posed a more stringent test than that put forth by Justice
Powell.84 In order to subpoena a news reporter and require
good faith; however, such limited privilege not applicable in this case), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 913 (1975).
77. Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976). See generally Bezanson, supra
note 2, at 760-61 n.137.
78. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
79. Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 684.
81. As a general rule, the public, through the grand jury, has a right to hear every
person's evidence and testimony. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438
(1932). "Citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoe-
nas; and neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision protects
the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in
confidence." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. Of course, a valid privilege such as the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination would protect both newsmen and pri-
vate citizens. Id. at 688-700.
82. See Bezanson, supra note 2, at 762.
83. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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him or her to reveal sources, the dissent thought the govern-
ment should show: (1) that the information is clearly rele-
vant; (2) that the news reporter has the information; and (3)
that no other means are available to obtain the informa-
tion. 5 Applying this test would probably yield more deci-
sions upholding a news reporter's privilege not to disclose
his or her sources. The Court, however, rejected both the
dissent's test and the analysis proposed by Justice Powell,
which favored a strict application of the neutrality doctrine.
The majority preferred an analysis which treated reporters
identical to other citizens.86
News sources are also not immune from discovery by
warrant. Over a strong dissent by Justices Stewart and Mar-
shall, the Court, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily ,87 held that the
first amendment granted the press no special privilege to re-
sist a search warrant obtained by the government.88 Equat-
ing the press with any other source of information, the Court
noted that "[w]here the material sought to be seized may be
protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exact-
itude.' "89 However, "no more than this is required where
the warrant requested is for the seizure of criminal evidence
reasonably believed to be on the premises occupied by a
newspaper." 9° The reasoning underlying the Court's deci-
sion in Zurcher, as in Branzburg, was the application of the
neutrality doctrine. The press received the same treatment
with respect to a search warrant that an ordinary citizen
would receive.9'
E. Prior Restraint
Strict application of the neutrality doctrine breaks down
in the area of prior restraint.92 As a general rule government
85. Id. at 740.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
87. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
88. Id. at 565-68.
89. Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 565.
91. Id. at 565-68.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.)
(United States sought a restraining order to enjoin magazine publishers from publish-
ing or otherwise communicating or disclosing data contained in an article entitled The
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interference with the editorial process is not permissible, es-
pecially an interference as extreme as restraining the pro-
spective publication of material.93 Thus, "'[a]ny system of
prior restraints of expression come to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'
However, in some limited instances, the Supreme Court has
recognized that modification of the neutrality doctrine is ap-
propriate as long as the government does not interfere with
the editorial process.
In Schenck v. United States 95 the Court advanced the the-
oretical justification for allowing violation of the neutrality
doctrine in order to insure the proper functioning of the
government:
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight, and that no court could re-
gard them as protected by any constitutional right. It
seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the
recruiting service were proved, liability for words that pro-
duced that effect might be enforced.96
The Court reiterated this clear and present danger theory in
Near v. Minnesota,97 in which Chief Justice Hughes, writing
for the Court, stated:
No one would question but that a government might pre-
vent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or publica-
tion of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops . . . . The security of the community
H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d
819 (7th Cir. 1979).
93. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(newspaper publisher alleged violation of first amendment rights based on Florida's
"right of reply" statute which granted a political candidate a right to equal space to
reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper in its editorial capacity).
94. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
95. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
96. Id. at 52.
97. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence
and the overthrow by force of orderly government. 98
Hence, prior restraint will be allowed when there is a suffi-
cient showing by the government that the release of the in-
formation sought to be restrained will pose a clear and
present danger of an immediate nature by impeding the
proper functioning of the government.
The issue of prior restraint and the conflicting interests it
involves were illustrated in a 1979 case. In United States v.
Progressive, Inc.,99 a Wisconsin district court enjoined a
magazine from publishing an article entitled, "The H-Bomb
Secret-How We Got It, Why We're Telling It."' °  The
court found that the publication of this article could seri-
ously interfere with the security and defense of the United
States by revealing defense secrets; therefore, the defendant's
first amendment rights had to give way to ensure that the
government could properly perform its function of protect-
ing the nation.101 Thus, where there is a threat of clear and
present danger, an accommodation should be made. The
strict hands-off approach of the neutrality doctrine must oc-
casionally give way in order to enable the government to
perform its special functions in society.10 2
F. Taxation of the Press
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in the
first amendment area is a case involving state taxation of the
press. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Commis-
sioner of Revenue,1°3 the Court addressed the question of
whether a use tax'04 imposed on products consumed during
98. Id. at 716 (footnote omitted).
99. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
See also United States v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
100. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 997-1000.
101. Id. at 991-97.
102. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
103. 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983).
104. A use tax is one enacted to protect a state's sales tax by eliminating the
incentive for residents to go to states with lower sales taxes rather than buying those
goods in-state. It does so by taxing those goods brought into and used in-state at a
rate equal to the tax savings acquired by buying the goods out-of-state. See id. at
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the publication process was constitutional. Minnesota had
passed a special use tax on ink and paper components; how-
ever, the first $100,000 of such goods used each year was ex-
empt.10 5 The newspaper contended that the tax violated the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and equal
protection. 0 6 The Court agreed.10 7
The Court first addressed the issue of whether or not the
tax violated the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press. Rather than apply its general sales and use tax to
newspapers, Minnesota had chosen to create a special use
tax. 0 8 The special use tax differed from the general use tax
because it applied to all ink and paper used, not just those
components bought out-of-state, and because it taxed an in-
termediate transaction, not an ultimate retail sale.10 9 The
Supreme Court found that this differential taxation"0 vio-
lated the freedom of the press as it is currently recognized
under the neutrality doctrine." As the Court stated:
Differential treatment, unless justified by some special
characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the reg-
ulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and
such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional. Differential
taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the in-
terests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot
countenance such treatment .... 112
The Court clearly grounded its decision on the neutrality
doctrine, although it did not label it as such. Instead the
Court reasoned:
We would be hesitant to fashion a rule that automatically
allowed the State to single out the press for a different
method of taxation as long as the effective burden was no
different from that on other taxpayers or the burden on the
press was lighter than that on other businesses. One reason
1368, 1370; National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551, 555 (1977).
105. Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. at 1368.
106. Id. at 1368-69.
107. Id. at 1375-76.
108. Id. at 1370.
109. Id.
110. The term "differential taxation" is one that was used by the Court to charac-
terize the special use tax. Id. at 1371.
111. Id. at 1372.
112. id. at 1372 (citations omitted).
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for this reluctance is that the very selection of the press for
special treatment threatens the press not only with the cur-
rent dfferential treatment, but with the possibility of subse-
quent differentially more burdensome treatment. Thus,
even without actually imposing an extra burden on the
press, the government might be able to achieve censorial
effects, for "the threat of sanctions may deter the exercise
of First Amendment rights almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions.""13
Applying the neutrality doctrine, the Court specifically
rejected Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that striking down a
favorable tax was, at best, foolish. Furthermore, the Court
disagreed that the first amendment required such action.' 4
Justice Rehnquist had concluded that because the tax was
favorable to the press it was not burdensome and therefore
not an abridgment of the freedom of the press. 15 The ma-
jority noted that Justice Rehnquist's suggestion would be
much more persuasive if it were always possible to identify
which differential treatment was really more or less burden-
some, and concluded this type of differential treatment was
unconstitutional. 1 6 Thus, the Court solidified the applica-
tion of the neutrality doctrine to cases involving press rights
in Minneapolis Star "' and clearly outlined its theoretical
justification." 8
113. Id. at 1374 (emphasis in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963)).
114. Id. at 1379 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1374 nn.1l-12.
117. The Court also rejected Justice Rehnquist's equal protection analysis. Id. at
1372 n.7. For Justice Rehnquist's equal protection analysis, see id. at 1378-79 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. But see Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), in which the Court struck down a 2% license tax
imposed on 13 newspaper publishers by the State of Louisiana. The Court in Minne-
apolis Star described the Grosjean case as one in which the result:
may have been attributable in part to the perception on the part of the Court
that the state imposed the tax with an intent to penalize a select group of news-
papers [for criticizing Senator Huey Long]. In the case currently before us,
however, there is no legislative history and no indication, apart from the
structure of the tax itself, of any impermissible or censorial motive on the part
of the legislature. We cannot resolve the case by simple citation to Grosean.
Instead, we must analyze the problem anew under the general principles of the
First Amendment.
Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. at 1369.
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Finally, the Court found that the $100,000 exemption
which tailored the tax so that it was applicable only to a
handful of newspapers "present[ed] such a potential for
abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the
scheme." 119
IV. THE PRIVILEGE OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESS
UNDER ATTACK
The emerging theme of a separate right or privilege for
the press, first noted by Justice Stewart,' 20 has not been
warmly received by some leading members of the press.' 2'
One journalist, Anthony Lewis,' 22 has set forth several criti-
cisms of the free press privilege.' 23 First, he claims that most
cases cited in support of the free press privilege could have
been decided under a straight free speech analysis.'24 For
example, Lewis contends that Branzburg v. Hayes' 25 was de-
cided on a free speech basis.' 26 In Lewis' view, any attempt
to find a free press right forces an artificial distinction
among the clauses of the first amendment.' 27 Similarly,
commenting on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo ,128
Lewis argued that the "holding does not imply a distinction
between the speech and press clauses of the First Amei)ad-
ment. Government can no more require a speaker thin a
newspaper to be neutral."' 29 Lewis does not rely solely on
Tornillo or Branzburg to support his viewpoint. In his
words:
Nor do the cases distinguish the quality of freedom assured
to the press and to speech. Of course there are practical
distinctions between speeches and publications, and be-
119. Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. at 1375-76.
120. See Stewart, supra note 7.
121. Id. at 631. See also Lange, supra note 4, at 88-95.
122. Lewis is a columnist for the New York Times and Lecturer on Law at the
Harvard Law School.
123. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 599. See generally A Depressing Tale, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1978, at A21, col. 3;Amending the Court, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at
A19, col. 5; The Court and the Press, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1978, at A27, col. 1.
124. Lewis, supra note 4, at 605.
125. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
126. Lewis, supra note 4, at 602.
127. Id. at 602-03.
128. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
129. Lewis, supra note 4, at 603.
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tween newspapers and books; and the law takes them into
account. But as the decided cases show, they are distinc-
tions without a difference in constitutional principle. No
Supreme Court decision has held or intimated that journal-
ism has a preferred constitutional position. 130
Despite Lewis' arguments, however, the preceeding analysis
has shown13 1 that the cases can and should be read as sug-
gested by Justice Stewart. There is indeed a special and sep-
arate free press right that is currently being enforced within
the confines of the neutrality doctrine. 132
Lewis apparently does not recognize the neutrality doc-
trine's main premise: that the press is to be treated in a fash-
ion identical to the general public. This treatment is not
based upon the speech rights of editors, but on their right to
be free from all types of governmental restraints under the
press clause.133 Lewis does not discuss the Court's shift in
focus in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 134 from a speech analysis
of media libel to a consideration of the institutional
processes and values surrounding the publication of the in-
formation involved. 135 Moreover, Lewis clings to the belief
that the Holmesian concept of a marketplace of ideas, in
which all ideas have the right to compete for acceptance, re-
mains the prevailing standard in any first amendment con-
troversy. While the marketplace concept remains valid
under a speech clause analysis, it ignores the Tornillo deci-
sion,136 which established that although the government
could enforce the full airing of any ideas and views that peo-
ple might wish to present on the village green, the govern-
ment could not force the press to become the marketplace
for airing all viewpoints. Such a result stems from the theo-
retical differences between the speech and press clauses. 37
130. Id. at 605.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
132. See Stewart, supra note 7.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 16-3 1.
134. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
135. Lewis, supra note 4, at 603.
136. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
137. Lewis apparently acknowledges this point when he states: "Justice Stewart
correctly described the decision [in Tornillo] as rejecting the idea that government
may force a newspaper to be a 'fair and open marketplace of ideas."' Lewis, supra
note 4, at 603 (emphasis added).
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Lewis also attacks the free press privilege on three theo-
retical grounds.' 38 The first of these arguments stems from
Lewis' reasonable fear that such a press "privilege" could
actually result in greater governmental interference with the
press. "The more formally [the press] is treated as a fourth
branch of government, the more pressing will be demands
that it be made formally accountable."' 139 Justifiably, this
idea causes an "uneasy feeling" for Lewis. However, the
application of the neutrality doctrine should ensure that the
press does not gain a position equivalent to a formal fourth
branch of government with its accompanying restraints. The
neutrality doctrine would prohibit almost all governmental
involvement with, or regulation of, the press. 140 The crea-
tion of an accommodation doctrine, as discussed below in
Part V,14 1 would not change the analysis, since it would
grant the press special privileges only in rare circumstances.
The press, therefore, would not rise to the level of a formal
fourth branch of the government. It is true, however, that
the tensions referred to by Lewis would be heightened.
Lewis' second theoretical argument is that a journalism-
centered privilege would damage the rights of others, nota-
bly professors and researchers. "The insistence that a partic-
ular class [namely the organized press] has special
immunities under the first amendment is likely to suggest to
judges that persons outside that class are of a lower order of
constitutional concern."1 42 While there is a certain truth in
Lewis' fear that other "truth seekers" and informers of the
public would be deprived of additional protection by sin-
gling out the press for separate treatment under the press
138. Id. at 605-25.
139. Id. at 605 (footnote omitted). See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976). "The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry
with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights
responsibly - a duty widely acknowledged but not always observed by editors and
publishers." Id. at 560.
140. Professor Lange suggests that this move to separate the press from the public
would deprive the press from its basis of support, its constituency, which would dras-
tically reduce its power as "[i]ts survival depends ultimately on the confidence and
goodwill of the people who support it." Lange, supra note 4, at 108. See also Sack,
supra note 4, at 630-31.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
142. Lewis, supra note 4, at 609.
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clause of the first amendment, that result would not deprive
those others of the rights they already possess, rights which
will not be and have not been ignored by the judiciary. As
the Supreme Court observed in First National Bank v. Bel-
lotti:' 14 3 "The press cases emphasize the special and constitu-
tionally recognized role of that institution in informing and
educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a fo-
rum for discussion and debate. . . . But the press does not
have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the abil-
ity to enlighten." 1 " As Bellotti makes clear, "the conclusion
that the press has a 'special and constitutionally recognized
role' is hardly inconsistent with the broadest grant of first
amendment rights to others-when those others are constitu-
tionally deserving of them."145
Lewis raises a third important question: who is "the in-
stitutional press" protected by the first amendment? Does it
include underground newspapers? Wall Street tip sheets?
Mimeographed copies distributed to neighbors? The lonely
pamphleteer? If the definition is broadened to include all
these and many other publications, "then any publication
becomes 'the press' and Justice Stewart's thesis loses its
point. His argument was that the first amendment has spe-
cial meaning for the news media."' 46 This is a strong point,
but not insurmountable. The difficulty in defining "the
press" is an insufficient basis for denying the existence of a
right associated with the term. As a leading media lawyer
suggests, 47 freedom of religion is a most useful analogy.
With equally vague constitutional guidance, courts regularly
define which group is or is not a religion and, on a case by
case basis, decide what constitutes religious activity. To
limit the protection afforded under the first amendment sim-
ply because it is difficult to define "the press" precisely
would lead "to the bizarre conclusion that in the interest of
protecting first amendment rights, we are precluded from en-
forcing any such rights."'' 48
143. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
144. Id. at 781-82 (citations and footnotes omitted).
145. Abrams, supra note 4, at 587.
146. Lewis, supra note 4, at 607.
147. Abrams, supra note 4, at 580.
148. Id. at 581.
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Three definitions of the press have been advanced. 149
One is all-inclusive, and embraces individuals who write or
broadcast. A second definition uses a functional approach
on a case-by-case basis and would afford protection if the
party involved was acting like the press. The third definition
is a strict institutional press definition and is similar to the
definition used in most state "shield laws," the laws which
protect journalists from revealing their sources. 150 Each of
these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, and the
choice of one by the Court would necessarily reflect a philo-
sophical judgment as to how broad the protection afforded
under the first amendment should be. While the adoption of
the third and narrowest definition would be the easiest, as
well as the clearest answer, the functional approach strikes a
better balance between the all-inclusive nature of the first
proposal and the strict statutory approach. As one commen-
tator points out: "In the great preponderance of cases, a
court has little difficulty knowing a journalist when it sees
one. Indeed, in virtually every first amendment press case in
recent years, there has been no definitional difficulty at
all."151
V. THE ACCOMMODATION DOCTRINE
The neutrality doctrine has, on the whole, worked well to
protect the press, permitting it to perform its important func-
tion in our society. However, in light of the changing role of
the press, the Supreme Court should adopt an accommoda-
tion doctrine in order to better protect the press. The chang-
ing role of the press is perhaps best illustrated in the Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 52 decision. In a unani-
mous opinion, the Court abandoned the theory of the press
as a provider of a marketplace of ideas, and adopted the idea
of the press as an adversarial check on the government. 53 In
Tornillo the "Court rejected any notion that, because the
press right is derived partially from the individual's right to
149. Id.
150. Id. at 581-82.
151. Id. at 580.
152. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
153. Id. at 251, 258.
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know, the government may impose restrictions on editorial
freedom deemed promotive of that right. Instead, the Court
viewed the press as an institution whose independence the
First Amendment protects .. .. ,1-4 Professor Bezanson
notes that:
[T]he marketplace conception is antithetical to the press'
function of taking positions on matters of public interest.
Tornillo reflects the Court's position that safeguarding this
function of the press [as an adversarial monitor of the gov-
ernment] is more important than inquiring whether the
coverage is balanced or partisan, responsible or
irresponsible.155
As Justice Douglas has stated: "The function of the press is
to explore and investigate events, inform the people what is
going on, and to expose the harmful as well as the good in-
fluences at work."'' 56 The Court has continued to stress this
structural, adversarial role. As Justice Brennan stated in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,'5 7 "the First Amend-
ment embodies more than a commitment to free expression
and communicative interchange for their own sakes: it has a
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republi-
can system of self-government.' 5 8 The Court also acknowl-
edged the important role the press plays in monitoring the
government in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,5 9 in which it granted the
President absolute immunity from civil damages for acts un-
dertaken as President.
Similarly, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue,160 the Court recently made state-
ments regarding the impact of censorship. The Court ex-
pressed concern that government threats could "check
critical comment by the press, undercutting the basic as-
154. Bezanson, supra note 2, at 757 (footnotes omitted); see also Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 258.
155. Bezanson, supra note 2, at 759.
156. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 722 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
158. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
159. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982). In Nixon, Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
stated: "In addition [to impeachment], there are formal and informal checks on Presi-
dential action that do not apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press." Id. at 2706.
160. 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983).
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sumption of our political system that the press will often
serve as an important restraint on government.' '
61
Justice Stewart has also forcefully rejected both the mar-
ketplace of ideas and the neutral conduit theories of the
press. As he stated in his Yale Law School Address:
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of
a free press was a similar one: to create a fourth institution
outside the Government as an additional check on the
three official branches. Consider the opening words of the
Free Press Clause of the Massachusetts Constitution,
drafted by John Adams: "The liberty of the press is essen-
tial to the security of the state."' 162
To accomplish its purpose as an independent check on the
government, the press must be guaranteed effective means to
gather and disseminate the news. In most cases the neutral-
ity doctrine serves this purpose well. It prohibits govern-
ment interference in the editorial process, guarantees
independence, and forces the press to act without special ac-
cess to information. This independence prevents the press
from becoming a quasi-governmental bureaucracy, with all
its drawbacks, restraints and forced accountability. How-
ever, the neutrality doctrine's rationale breaks down in prior
restraint cases in which the government may encroach upon
the domain of the editor and force him or her not to print or
broadcast that which would otherwise be published. 163 The
justification for this violation of the neutrality doctrine is
that such restraint is necessary for the government to per-
form one of its essential functions. For example, a govern-
ment could not effectively wage a war if the press were
161. Id. at 1372. See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233,
250 (1936) ("A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the govern-
ment and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.").
162. Stewart, supra note 7, at 634. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 22 which
states, "[firee speech and liberty of the press are essential to the security of freedom in
a state: They ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved." See also T. WICKER, ON
PREss 259-60 (1978). Wicker suggests that the press should act like a defense lawyer
on cross-examination-probe and make the opposition prove what they claim.
163. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,716
(1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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allowed to disclose secret troop or ship movements.164 If the
neutrality doctrine can be modified to accommodate the spe-
cial needs of the government, it should also be modified to
accommodate the special role of the press. However, the
press must clearly demonstrate that it needs a certain degree
of preferential treatment to fulfill its duties as an investiga-
tory, adversarial check on the government. 65 In addition, it
must show that granting those privileges will not create a
long-term, debilitating dependence on the government and
that no other means are available to enable the press to per-
form its constitutional function.
The accommodation doctrine has been alluded to in case
law. In the Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 166 decision, in which the
Court upheld restrictions on press access to a jail, Justice
Stewart concurred with the majority and stated:
We part company however, in applying these abstractions
[of the neutrality doctrine] to the facts of the case.
Whereas [Chief Justice Burger] appears to view "equal ac-
cess" as meaning access that is identical in all respects, I
believe that the concept of equal access must be accorded
more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical dis-
tinctions between the press and the general public. 67
He adds: "In short, terms of access that are reasonably im-
posed on individual members of the public may, if they im-
pede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to con-
vey to the general public what the visitors see."' 168
Justice Powell also appears to acknowledge the need for
an accommodation doctrine, although he based his dissent
in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 169 on a general first amend-
ment right and not specifically on the press clause. In the
Saxbe case, in which the Court again upheld restraints on
prison access, Justice Powell stated in his dissent:
164. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis.) (citing
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
165. See generally Bezanson, supra note 2, at 770-7 1.
166. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
167. Id at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 17.
169. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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At some point official restraints on access to news sources,
even though not directed solely at the press, may so under-
mine the function of the First Amendment that it is both
appropriate and necessary to require the government to
justify such regulations in terms more compelling than dis-
cretionary authority and administrative convenience. It is
worth repeating our admonition in Branzburg that "with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated." 170
Similarly, in Branzburg v. Hayes,17 1 Justice Powell wrote:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its
facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom
of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give rele-
vant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The bal-
ance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a
case by case basis accords with the tried and traditional
way of adjudicating such questions. 17 2
In the area of press rights, Justice Powell believes that there
should be no per se rules at work. Rather, in light of the
special role the press fulfills in our society, there should be a
balancing of constitutional interests and an accommodation
on behalf of the press.
Recently the Court came close to explicitly adopting the
accommodation doctrine in Minneapolis Star & Tribune v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, in which the Court
found that the select differential tax imposed on newspapers
by the state of Minnesota violated the neutrality doctrine. 74
However, rather than basing its opinion solely on that doc-
trine, the Court proceeded to weigh the countervailing inter-
ests asserted by the state to justify the differential taxation
scheme. In effect, the Court applied the rationale of the ac-
commodation doctrine and examined whether using the dif-
170. Id. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
681 (1972)). See also Justice Powell's opinion in the companion case, Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), in which he states, "I would hold that California's
absolute ban against prisoner-press interviews impermissibly restrains the ability of
the press to perform its constitutionally established function of informing the people
on the conduct of their government." Id. at 835 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
171. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
172. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
173. 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983).
174. Id. at 1372.
[Vol. 67:33
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
ferential taxation scheme was necessary for the state to
perform an essential governmental function. The implica-
tion seemed to be that if the tax was necessary, the Court
would accommodate the State's special need and allow the
neutrality doctrine to be modified. 175
Regarding the state's interest, the Court commented that
"[d]ifferential taxation of the press, then, places such a bur-
den on the interests protected by the First Amendment that
we cannot countenance such treatment unless the State as-
serts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance
that it cannot achieve without differential taxation." 176 Min-
nesota claimed that the essential governmental function in-
volved was that of raising revenue.1 77 The Court responded
that there were many alternative methods of raising revenue
that did not adversely affect first amendment rights.17 8 Thus,
it was not necessary to bend the neutrality doctrine in order
to accommodate an essential government function, as it is
sometimes necessary to do, for example, in the area of prior
restraints. When applying prior restraint, it is theoretically
necessary to infringe upon the freedom of the press in order
to allow the government to fulfill one of its essential func-
tions, such as national defense. In the revenue raising area,
however, the Court correctly held that it was not necessary
to infringe on freedom of the press. Therefore, since the
Court has implicitly recognized the theory of accommoda-
tion in two areas of first amendment law, prior restraint and
taxation, it is now time for it to recognize that the accommo-
dation doctrine can and should work in favor of, as well as
against, the press. Recognition of the press' need for accom-
modation and the strong policy reasons favoring the recogni-
tion of such need should move the Court to adopt an
accommodation doctrine.
An accommodation doctrine, such as that hinted at in the
case law, 179 is vital to the proper fulfillment by the press of
its role. Just as the government, on occasion, needs some
175. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
176. Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. at 1372, (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see
also id. at 1370.
177. Minneapolis Star, 103 S. Ct. at 1372.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 164-75.
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special accommodation to enable it to perform fully and effi-
ciently its duties, the press, on occasion, has the same need
for accommodation in order to fulfill its responsibilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The murky history of the first amendment makes it im-
possible to know with certainty why its framers wrote sepa-
rate speech and press clauses. Case law has developed the
tacit recognition of a separate press right, a right circum-
scribed by the dictates of the neutrality doctrine. The neu-
trality doctrine acts to preserve the independence of the
press by insulating it from the "heavy hand" of the govern-
ment in editorial matters. At the same time, it prohibits
granting special privileges to the press that could eventually
create a self-defeating dependence by the press on the gov-
ernment. As a result of the doctrine, the press generally has
only those rights enjoyed by the general public.
Yet, as discussed above,' 80 in order for the press to prop-
erly perform its constitutional role as an independent check
on government, it may be necessary, in certain limited situa-
tions, to bend the application of the neutrality doctrine to
accommodate the interests of the press. Protection of confi-
dential sources, for example, may be an appropriate justifi-
cation for accommodation.1 8' At least twenty-six states have
recognized the need to enact, and have enacted, shield laws
to protect such sources. 82
180. See, for example, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which
the court bent the strict neutrality doctrine by imposing a negligence standard for
media libel of nonpublic persons rather than taking a hands-off approach by leaving
the standard to the statutory or common law of the individual states.
181. A Depressing Tale, supra note 123 ("[The Sunday Times] has proved, con-
trary to the current American press mystique, that a newspaper can get vital informa-
tion from confidential sources without any special legal protection.").
182. Abrams, supra note 4, at 582 n.113; see ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1977);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.25.150-.220 (1973 & Supp. 1982); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp.
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 8-901
to -909 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (West 1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451 - :1454 (West
1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.59 (West 1982) (criminal procedure); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West
Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-901 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -
147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ A:84A-21, -21a, -29
[Vol. 67:33
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to explicitly ad-
dress the question of press rights and to adopt the accommo-
dation doctrine to protect the constitutionally guaranteed
right of freedom of the press. To treat the press under a per
se neutrality rule and grant the press only the privileges that
all citizens have as part of their right of free speech may be
insufficient to enable the press to properly perform the duties
our society imposes upon the press. Moreover, adoption of
the accommodation doctrine may also be necessary in order
to give full effect to the language of the first amendment and
the guarantees afforded thereunder.
(West 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506
(West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5942
(Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp. 1982-1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-1-208 (1980).
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